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Abstract 
The years between 1945 and 1957 represent a time period in which 
Canadian foreign policy emerged. It was during this time that Canada 
became a truly sovereign and autonomous nation, and was beginning to 
receive recognition on the international stage. Issues to be examined 
include: transformation of Canadian foreign policy from heavy dependence 
on Britain to becoming an autonomous function of the domestic 
government; the increase in involvement in multilateral organizations, and 
how the instability of these encouraged the diversification of external 
policies; the effects of internal influences, mainly changing domestic 
governments, and that of external influences, including allies and enemies; 
and the effects of the Suez crisis in 1956 and how the fundamentals of 
Canadian foreign policy materialized.  
To comprehend how Canadian foreign policy developed into what it is 
today, it is crucial to understand the conditions in which original policy was 
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based. The years between 1945 and 1957 represent a time period in 
which Canadian foreign policy emerged. It was during this time that Canada 
became a truly sovereign and autonomous nation, and began to receive 
recognition on the international stage. In order to gain depth into this 
development it is important to study world events leading up to this period, 
including the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. One must 
also investigate the developments surrounding this time period; specifically: 
how Canadian external policies transformed from being dependent on Britain to 
becoming an autonomous unit operating within the government; the increase in 
involvement in multilateral organizations, and how the instability of these 
encouraged the diversification of external policies; the effects of internal 
influences, mainly the federal government, and that of external influences, 
including the impact of allies and enemies; and the effects of the Suez crisis in 
1956 and how the fundamentals of Canadian foreign policy materialized.  
To first comprehend how Canadian foreign policy originally took shape, it 
is essential to consider the world situation of the time. The end of the First 
World War, in 1918, created a desire among nations to ensure global stability 
and a balance of power. This ultimately led to the creation of international 
organizations, the first most notably being the League of Nations. This strategic 
military alliance was designed to provide a balance of power to the Axis of Evil 
but proved to be unsuccessful 1 as world events eventually led to the Second 
World War. The demise of the League of Nations appeared to be the beginning 
and end of multilateral organizations; however upon the conclusion of World 
War II (1945) many nations were again eager to ensure international stability. 
The renewed inspiration among nations ultimately resulted in the United 
Nations (U.N.). The difference between the League of Nations and the U.N. 
was most notably “the United Nations [was more of] an organization for 
diplomacy rather than [en enforcer] of collective security” (“Shaping of Peace” 
Vol. 2 292). This was reflected in the organization of the U.N. Security Council, 
which was primarily a monopoly of super-powers dominating the interests of the 
council 2 . This fundamental ineffectiveness of the U.N. was a primary motivator 
to the creation of new security alliances including; the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. The development of these 
multilateral institutions eventually resulted in the shift of the international 
political stage. The end of the World Wars marked the beginning of an intense 
and ideologically motivated war, which later became known as the Cold War. 
Divisions of ideology between Western nations (primarily the United States), 
and Eastern nations (primarily the Soviet Union), was another reason previous 
war-time alliances became ineffective, and thus highlighted the need for new 
security alliance such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This disintegration of 
alliances in addition to the “unprincipled use of the veto [which] paralyzed the 
United Nations” was just the beginning of the changing international relations of 
the world (Granatstein 2).  
During this time of international adjustment Canadian foreign policy was 
also beginning to evolve. Traditionally Canada tended to be isolationistic in her 
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approach to external relations, described as containing a “lingering 
colonial mentality” (“Canadian External Policies” 137).  
... Canadian foreign policy was virtually non-
existent, and aside from the small but 
influential Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs, there were few men interested in 
current policy outside the ranks of the 
department of External Affairs. (Granatstein 
1)  
Although Canada created the Department of External Affairs in 1909, 
designed to provide some level of autonomy in the world arena, Canada did not 
legally have control over external relations until 1931 with the Statute of 
Westminster (Melakopides 37). This being said, however, policies of 
isolationism favoured by Mackenzie King, and Canada's strong links to Britain 
led to Canada's involvement in the Second World War, as King gave in to 
Chamberlain's policies of appeasement (Melakopides 37). It is due to this that 
some would argue that Canada's external relations were “conducted in a semi-
autonomous fashion” up until 1945 3 (Melakopides 37). Even after the era of 
British domination over Canadian foreign policy Canada still insisted on policies 
of isolationism. King took pride in his vision of Canada, one in which concern of 
domestic issues over-rid the need to be burdened by foreign issues (“Canadian 
External Policies” 137). King's isolationistic policies were to avoid conflicts 
overseas principally due to the domestic issues that were created as a result, 
primarily the conscription crisis during the First World War, which ultimately 
divided the nation (Melakopides 37). 
It is in this time in which Canada resumed her focus on domestic issues 
that the external world began to evolve into the ideological differences which 
would transform international relations.  
The Atlantic Alliance... had long shed its original character of a multilateral 
coalition of reciprocal advantage between the North American and European 
members and had become, from the security standpoint, largely a relationship 
of guarantor and guaranteed and, from the political, appeared to be moving 
towards a bi-polar American-European system in which Canada's place was 
uncertain. (Buchan 16) 
It appeared as though Canada's place in the international system was 
becoming uncertain. This was largely due to the fact Canada placed much of 
“its security eggs in the U.N. basket in 1945, and the armed forces had been 
demobilized” (Granatstein 2). It was in this time that the United Nations had 
been “declin[ing] steadily in authority and relevance” 4 that posed the biggest 
threat to Canadian security (Buchan 16). Lester B. Pearson recognized Canada 
had too much conviction in the U.N. in 1946 as he said “little confidence can be 
placed in the ability of the U.N. to guarantee security... ” (qtd. in Pearson 19). 
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Regardless of this supposed decline, however, Mackenzie King's idea of 
functionalism revived Canada's place on the world stage. This idea enforced 
the belief that “each nation should have responsibility appropriate to its 
particular capacities” (“Canadian External Policies” 137). This functional theory, 
as it later became known, proved Canada's role as a middle power was 
important in the international system. It was not until the end of the Mackenzie 
King government that Canada began to fully embrace her role as an 
international actor.  
The tradition of conducting foreign affairs semi-autonomously ended in 
1948 when the King government was replaced by Louis St. Laurent. The new 
Prime Minister was described as “less inhibited by the phobias which had 
prevented both nationalists and imperialists in the past from seeing Canada's 
place in the world clearly and confidently” (“Canadian External Policies” 138). 
With the change of government in Canada came the beginning of what is 
known as the “St. Laurent-Pearson Era [(1945-57)]” which contributed to the 
shaping of foreign policy for succeeding years (Melakopides 38). Laurent 
brought a new vision to Canadian foreign policy as he embraced his new 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lester B. Pearson (“Canadian External 
Policies” 137).  
Under Pearson's direction, Canada increased her involvement in 
numerous multilateral organizations. These organizations were not limited to 
security commitments, as most did in the past, but also encompassed 
economic and social obligations. Such organizations included: Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank 5 . During this same 
time period Canada engaged in numerous international treaties and pacts 
increasing the size of international commitments;  
... [These commitments] included sustained 
contributions that spanned the entire 
spectrum of the U.N.'s agenda and 
mandate... Canada dealt energetically and 
creatively with social, economic, educational, 
and technical issues, including those of 
disarmament and arms control. (Melakopides 
41) 
John Holmes indicates in his essay on Canadian external policies, 
Canadian diplomatic missions and international responsibilities “multiplied from 
seven in 1939 to sixty five in 1962” (138). Participation in such obligations 
promoting economic and social security may have increased in such a dramatic 
fashion since a deep sense of Canadian self-importance in foreign relations 
developed as a result of such involvement. The pride of Canadian contributions 
to multilateral organizations eventually became an expectation among foreign 
policy advocates. 
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It is worthy of noting that Canada's foreign policy of the time was heavily 
influenced by close allies, such as Britain and more importantly the United 
States. As international events transpired and the Cold War continued to divide 
nations, it became apparent Canada must consider her relations with the U.S., 
and the outcomes if a war were to ever become a reality (Granatstein 3). 
Canadian involvement in NATO was largely due to the events surrounding the 
Berlin Blockade, which was believed to be the beginning of another World War. 
It was Pearson's view that signing onto NATO “was the best hope to prevent 
war in the absence of a UN system of collective security” (Seize the day, 24). 
Canada's geographical proximity to the U.S. also motivated the signing of the 
Ogdensburg Agreement 6 , and later the NORAD agreement; due to the idea 
that if a war to ever be fought between the Soviet Union and the United States, 
Canada would be devastated (Melakopides 40; Granatstein 3).  
Although Canada's external relations were being influenced by the great 
powers, Canada continued to maintain commitment to multilateral 
organizations. Canadian involvement in the Korean War was “nominally under 
the aegis of the U.N. but in fact an American-run operation” (Granatstein 2). It 
became apparent that Canada became involved in foreign issues, not due to 
their interest in them, but because of their “lack of interests,” this was the basis 
of Canada's “reputation for objectivity and independence, if not neutrality, in 
international affairs” (“Canadian External Policies” 137). As Canada attempted 
to maintain impartiality in global affairs she was also responsible for shaping 
these affairs. Upon becoming involved with NATO Canada insisted that the 
organization not merely be a “collectiveness of common defense,” but also a 
medium for non-military cooperation (Melakopides 44). This determination 
ultimately resulted in Article 2 7 of the NATO charter (Melakopides 44). The 
values Canada pursued during the time not only shaped NATO but also laid the 
foundation of future foreign policy. 
It was not until the Suez Canal Crisis 8 of 1956 that Canada exercised the 
diplomacy and neutrality which would become the cornerstone of all Canadian 
foreign policy. The Suez Canal was a time of high tension between Egypt, 
Israel, Britain, and France. Essentially the conflict stemmed from a long list of 
different events involving these countries, but was highlighted by the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 by the Egyptian government. Britain 
and France took issue with this since they had invested a significant amount of 
money into the construction of the canal, and therefore a controlling stake of 
the canal. With the nationalization came the possibility of losing their controlling 
stake over the operation of the canal, which may have resulted in the upset of 
Western economies as the canal was a major oil supply route. Pressure for war 
mounted as aspects from the Cold War besieged the conflict. It appeared as 
though the conflict would result in the next World War. Some compared the 
situation to that of Hitler, and the beginnings of the Second World War. During 
the crisis Canada and the United States were called upon, as in the past, by 
Britain to support the old war-time alliances. However Canada and the U.S. 
both refused to become entangled in yet another European conflict. As the 
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circumstances intensified Canada insisted on diffusing the situation, and 
this became a top priority of Canada foreign policy. (Pearson 137-155)  
The Suez crisis was very significant for Canada as it threatened to 
undermine the international institutions Canada had been committed to. 
Pearson was apprehensive about the fact that if Britain were to take action in 
the Suez crisis, the Commonwealth would be divided, NATO would be ruined 
and the United Nations would be undermined 9 (English 131). Specifically there 
were three main concerns of Canada, Prime Minister Laurent commented;  
The first was the impact on the United Nations, whose position was 
undermined by the British-French-Israel joint action. The second was the 
Commonwealth, whose unity was threatened... The third was ‘the deplorable 
divergence of viewpoints and policy between the U.K. and the U.S... [whose] 
cooperation and friendship is the very foundation of our hopes for progress 
toward a peaceful and secure world. (qtd. in English 135) 
Such comments by the Prime Minister indicated the seriousness of the 
situation, which required immediate action. It was the foreign affairs minister, 
Pearson, who turned his full attention to preventative action in the middle-east. 
Pearson eventually developed the idea of the United Nations Emergency Force 
(UNEF), commonly known as peacekeeping, to intervene in the imposing 
situation (Buchan 17). As Robert Bothwell indicates it was through Canadian 
neutrality that Pearson was able to bridge the gap between seemingly old allies 
(26). Acting through this neutrality Canada was able to maintain objectivity in 
the situation as to not damage close ties with allies, but to also ensure that 
military confrontation never occurred. The new concepts of peacekeeping 
allowed time to attempt to reach a resolution 10 on the Suez issue. It was upon 
this that Canadian foreign policy of multilateralism was truly established, as 
Pearson renewed faith in the U.N. as a body capable of handling “regional or 
global crisis by diplomatic means” (Melakopides 40). In 1957 Pearson was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in creating the UNEF, Pearson 
commented “in the end, the whole problem always returns to people... to one 
person and his own individual response to the challenge that confronts 
him” (qtd. in English 143). Success in handling global conflicts in such a 
diplomatic manner gave way to the Canadian tradition of being a leader in 
peacekeeping; over the next ten years Canada was engaged in numerous 
operations in countries including: Lebanon, Congo, Yemen, New Guinea, 
Cyprus, and India-Pakistan (Granatstein 3). This involvement solidified 
Canada's role in world affairs, and gave Canadians an immense pride in their 
nation on the global stage. This carried over to foreign affairs by popular 
demand in Canada, and has since been a major contributing factor in 
developing new foreign relation policies. 
After examining the conditions in which Canadian foreign policy was 
created it becomes apparent that many events played a factor in forging the 
policy. It was in a time of change, where a major shift in the balance of power 
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occurred, and a time of uncertainty that Canada managed to lay the 
foundation of her foreign policy. The policy at the time was largely a result of 
the international events that were occurring and the open-mindedness of the 
Canadian government. The importance of international organizations has been 
ingrained into Canadian government. These traditions created from the time 
period between 1945 and 1957 have given Canada a highly respected name on 
the world stage, and a reputation of neutrality. This reputation will most likely be 
the basis of future foreign policies, as Canadians have a deep sense of pride in 
their countries involvement in global affairs. 
Endnotes 
1. The failure of the League of Nations was due to a number of complex issues 
relating to World War I. For more information see Holmes 188. 
2. The veto power allocated to each of the super-powers on the Security 
Council led to over-all ineffectiveness of the council ("Shaping of Peace" Vol. 
2). 
3. The end of World War II and Canada's involvement in peace-talks is when 
many believe the strong British influence in Canadian politics officially ended. 
See Granatstein 2-3. 
4. This decline is largely attributed to the aforementioned monopoly of super-
powers in the Security Council. Refer to page 6 for more information 
5. These are only a few of the most notable institutions Canada became 
involved with. 
6. An agreement promoting the cooperation of Canada-U.S. military, see 
Ogdensburg Agreement for more information. 
7. The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and 
friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by 
bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these 
institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. 
They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and 
will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. (North 
Atlantic Treaty). 
8. For more in-depth information on the Suez crisis see Pearson 137-155 and 
Suez Crisis. 
9. "...[I]f Britain attacked Nasser it 'would be brought before the UN as an 
aggressor;'" if such action were to occur it was believed that the UN would 
undoubtedly collapse (English 130). 
10. A permanent resolution was not successful, but Pearson's initiatives 
allowed time to alleviate tensions and prevent a war (Granatstein 3). 
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